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MUST METAPHYSICAL TIME
HAVE A BEGINNING?
Wes Morriston

In the present paper, I seek to establish, first, that the a priori arguments
against the infinite past are vital to the overall success of the kalam argument.
Merely appealing to the big bang theory of the origin of the universe will not
do the trick. In the second place, I show that neither of these arguments is at
all successful in showing that "metaphysical time" has a beginning. Along the
way, various discoveries are made about the relation of dynamic time to the
possibility that the past has no beginning. The final section of the paper shows
that if (as is commonly assumed) there is a complete body of truth about the
future, then an endless future is (also) an actual infinite.

Proponents of the kalam cosmological argumentl seek to establish, not
only that the beginning of the universe has a cause, but also that the cause of
this beginning is a first cause - one not caused by any prior cause. It is therefore important to their overall project to establish that the series of events (if
any) leading up to the creation of the universe also has a beginning.
This may seem unnecessary. Time, it may be said, came into existence
along with the physical universe, so that it is not even meaningful "to ask
what happened before the big bang."2 It is far from clear, however, that
this is the right way to look at things.
To see this, suppose that the big bang was caused by a personal agent
who did some other things first. To borrow an example from William
Lane Craig, the Creator could have done a sort of "count down" to creation: Five, jour, three, two, one, Let there be lightP Had he done so, there
would have been a temporal series of distinct mental events leading up to
the creation of the physical universe.
Craig has called this a "knockdown argument" for the conclusion that
"time as it plays a role in physics is at best a measure of time rather than constitutive or definitive of time."4 He believes that time itself - or metaphysical
time, as he calls it - is tensed, dynamic, and non-relative. On this view of
time, there is an ever changing fact of the matter about which events are
future, which present, and which past. Future events become present, present events become past, and past events sink ever further into the past.
We have just seen that a series of mental events succeeding one another
in this kind of time is at least conceivable independently of the existence of
our universe. But there also does not seem to be any a priori bar to the
possibility of a temporal series of non-mental events occurring prior to the
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beginning of our space-time. If he had wanted to, God could have created
a whole series of universes, each with its own history and its own special
laws, prior to creating ours. Alternatively, one universe might have arisen
from the ruins of a previous one without any special divine intervention.
We may not have an adequate theory to explain how this could have happened, but it is one of the logical possibilities. s
This might seem to leave open the further possibility that the cause of
our universe is only the most recent in an infinite temporal series of causes
and effects. However, most proponents of the kalam cosmological argument believe that this can be ruled out on purely a priori grounds. Craig,
for example, deploys two distinct philosophical arguments for saying that
time (and not just the universe) must have a beginning.
According to the first of these arguments, an infinite series of past events
is impossible because no actually infinite set of objects can be instantiated in
reality. According to the second argument, an infinite series of past events
would be impossible whether or not an actually infinite set of simultaneously existing objects could be instantiated in reality. The reason given is that
no infinite series formed by "successive addition" can be completed.
Unfortunately, I believe that neither of these philosophical arguments is
successful. In the next two sections, I take aim at the successive addition
argument. The remainder of the paper will be devoted to Craig's argument against the possibility of an actual infinite.

The successive addition argument
Craig summarizes the successive addition argument as follows.
1. The temporal series of past events is a collection formed by successive addition.
2. A collection formed by successive addition cannot be actually infinite.
3. Therefore, the temporal series of past events cannot be actually
infinite. 6
On a dynamic theory of time, premise 1 seems straightforward enough.
It says that the events in the series of past events have happened successively, one after the other. Each event has become past, followed by another which also became past, up until the present.
But what about premise 2? Why can't a collection formed in this stepby-step way have infinitely many members? Craig's answer is that an infinite collection can never be completed. No matter how many members are
added to the collection, one could always add another. So no matter how
many are added, the number of elements in the collection is necessarily
finite. Infinity never arrives.
This is obviously how it is with any series having a temporal beginning.
Consider, for example, the series of years that began on January 1, 1901.
One hundred of its member years have passed by. The hundred and third
is nearly completed. But no matter how many years are added, only finitely many years will have been added to this series. The series of years
beginning on January 1, 1901 will never be a completed infinity.
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But what about a series having no temporal beginning? Why couldn't
there have been an infinite series of years in which there was no first year?
It's true that in such a series we never "arrive" at infinity, but surely that is
only because infinity is, so to speak, "always already there." At every point
in such a series, infinitely many years have already passed by. Where, it
may be asked, does Craig think he has shown that an infinite series of past
events must arrive at infinity?
It might be thought that this objection overlooks the reality of temporal
becoming. If a series of events is formed by the successive addition of one
event after another, how can it fail to have a first member? I answer:
Whether this conclusion follows depends on what is meant by saying that
a series is formed by successive addition. If this is only a way of saying that
each event in the series is added to the earlier ones (if any) until the series
is complete, then it is certainly true that the series of past events is formed
by successive addition. But from this alone it does not follow that there is a
first event in the series. Each event in a beginningless series terminating in
the present could have been "added" to the infinitely many prior events.
(If you have a problem with this, it is probably because you have a more
general problem with the actual infinite. More on this below.)
I fear that what defenders of the kalam argument really mean when they
say that any temporal series must be formed by successive addition is something like this: Beginning with the first event in the series, events are successively added until the series is complete. But now premise 1 of the argument is the problematic premise. It is utterly question-begging to assume
that every series of events must have been formed starting with a first event.
Certainly, nothing like that follows from a dynamic theory of time.
However, Craig denies that his argument makes this question-begging
assumption. "The fact that there is no beginning at all, not even an infinitely distant one," he says, "makes the difficulty worse, not better."7 And
he joins G. J. Whitrow in urging that the question of how an infinite
sequence of events "could actually be produced" has been "ignored."s
But surely it is Craig who has not properly faced up to the question how
a beginningless sequence of past events would be "produced." He supposes that it would have to be by "successive addition." But can he explain
what he means by "successive addition" in such a way as to make premise
2 of his argument true? Can he do so without presupposing that the series
of past events must have a beginning? I see no reason to believe that he can.
An incautious reasoner might be tempted to suppose that since the
past is composed of events that have "passed away" - beginning, enduring, and coming to an end - the past as a whole must have "passed away"
in this same sense. But when we are thinking clearly, and do not fall into
a fallacy of composition, we see that this does not follow unless it is also
assumed that the past has a beginning. And that, let us not forget, is the
very point at issue.
I conclude that a dynamic theory of time does not by itself commit us to
the view that "formation by successive addition" entails "formation from a
starting point." Consequently, we have no reason to accept premise 2 of
the successive addition argument.
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Why didn't it all happen earlier?

So far, I have been defending the possibility that infinity is "always
already there" - that at every point in the series of past events, infinitely
many others have already passed by. Craig attacks this suggestion directly. "If the universe did not begin to exist a finite time ago," he says, "then
the present moment could never arrive."9 He explains and defends this
claim by way of the following imaginary example:
... suppose we meet a man who claims to have been counting from
eternity, and now he is finishing: -5, -4, -3, -2, -1, O. Now this is impossible. For, we may ask, why didn't he finish counting yesterday or
the day before or the year before? By then an infinity of time had
already elapsed, so that he should have finished. The fact is, we could
never find anyone completing such a task because at any previous
point he would have already finished.lO
I do not think this is a good argument. It confuses "having counted infinitely many negative numbers" with "having counted all the negative numbers up to zero." The man in Craig's example has indeed always already
completed the first of these tasks; but he has not completed the second one
until he arrives at zero. When he arrived at -1 he completed a different task
that of counting all the members in the series
< .., -n, .., -2, -1 >. When he arrived at -2, he completed yet another taskthat of counting all the members in the series, < .., -n, .., -3, -2 >. And so on.
Craig has tried to answer this obvious objection. In order to show that
an infinite count could have been completed, he thinks his opponent must
appeal to the Principle of Correspondence, according to which two sets
have the same number of members if they can be placed in one-to-one correspondence.
On the basis of this principle the objector argues that since the
counter has lived, say, an infinite number of years and since the set of
past years can be put into a one-to-one correspondence with the set of
negative numbers, it follows that by counting one number a year an
eternal counter would complete a countdown of the negative numbers by the present year. 11
Notice how deftly Craig shifts the burden of proof to his opponent here.
The objector may not have intended to give an argument for saying that a
beginningless count is genuinely possible. He may merely have been asking Craig to show that it is not possible, and pointing out that he has not
done so until he has excluded a certain apparent possibility.
But let that pass. Having attributed this argument for the infinite past to
his opponent, Craig presses home his own point. Why, he asks, wouldn't
the counter finish "next year or in a hundred years?" He supposes that the
only reply available to his opponent is to say that "prior to the present year
an infinite number of years will have already elapsed, so that by the
Principle of Correspondence, all the numbers should have been counted by
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now." Since this is precisely the reasoning the opponent objected to when
he accused Craig of confusing counting infinitely many numbers with
counting all the numbers, Craig concludes that the objection "backfires" on
his opponent. 12
This dialectical maneuver of Craig's is puzzling, to say the least. If his
opponent were to respond in the way suggested, then he would have
made the same mistake as Craig. But it doesn't follow that it is not a mistake or that Craig has not made it.
Craig apparently thjnks that this is what his opponent must say. But in
this he is surely mistaken. The proper response to the question why the
counter wouldn't finish "next year or in a hundred years" is not to say,
"Because infinitely many numbers can already have been counted by
now." It is rather to turn the question back at Craig, and ask why the
count should not be ending now. Why should it end later than now? No
doubt there could have been a beginillngless count ending in zero "next
year or in a hundred years." But it does not follow that there cannot also be
one terminating in the present. Certainly, Craig cannot show that a count
ending in zero now is not possible merely by arguing that one ending in
zero next year would also be possible.
To put the point a bit differently, why is this even a question that Craig's
opponent needs to answer? Why does the opponent need to explain why
the counter finished today rather than some other day? Why isn't enough
to say, "That's how we imagined the case?"
It may be thought, however, that I have not properly appreciated the
main thrust of Craig's argument. Although he doesn't spell it out clearly,
perhaps the argument he really has in mind goes something like this. If a
beginillngless count were possible, there would have to be some reason why
the counter finishes when he does. Since no such reason can be given, it
follows that a beginillngless count is not possible. 13
Let's try to state the proposed argument a bit more carefully. When
Craig asks, "Why didn't he finish counting yesterday (or tomorrow)?" he
is asking:
(CQ) Why is the whole series of "counting events" leading up to
"zero" located at the beginningless series of temporal positions that terminates in the present, rather than at the beginningless series of temporal positions that terminated yesterday
(or tomorrow)?
And the reason this question seems so compelling to him is that he is
implicitly committed to something like the following argument:
1. If a beginillngless count is possible, then there must be an answer to
CQ - i.e., there must be a reason why the whole series of counting events is
located at the series of temporal locations that terminates in the present.
2. No such reason can be given.
3. Therefore, a beginillngless count ending in zero is not possible.
Does this argument succeed in establishing the impossibility of a begin-
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ningless count? The first thing to see is that if we are to make sense of CQ
(and premise 1), we must suppose that there are two distinct series - a
series of past counting events and a series of past times. For convenience,
let's suppose that the past is divided into segments of equal length and that
each past event occupies one and only one of these segments of duration.
Assuming that the series of past events is infinite, we can represent the two
series as follows:

Then what CQ amounts to is this: "Why do the events in ES map onto the
chunks of duration in TS in the way that they do?" Since both series are
beginningless, it could just as easily have been the case that Eo happened at
T_l' K! at T_2, and so on. So why does the series of events terminate at To
rather than at T_l or at some earlier time? Why, for example, aren't they
correlated in the following way?

Now it is not immediately obvious that there must be an answer to CQ
or that the possibility of a beginningless count depends on the possibility of
an answer to this question. Why couldn't it be a brute contingent fact that
ES maps onto TS in the way that it does? Why couldn't CQ be one of those
big questions that simply cannot be answered? Why couldn't it have a status comparable to that of other "stumpers" such as: Why is there anything
at all? Or: Why these laws of nature?
To suppose that questions like these must have answers is implicitly to
assume that something like Leibniz's Principle of Sufficient Reason is a
necessary truth. Is it possible that Craig wants to rest his case on this highly controversial principle? That he assumes without discussion or argument that brute contingency is impossible? One wouldn't have thought so.
After all, one of the strengths claimed for the kalam argument is that it
makes do with the weaker (and more widely accepted) principle that
whatever begins to exist must have a cause.!4
But let that pass. Suppose, at least for the sake of argument, that if a
beginningless count is possible then there must be an answer to CQ. Why
should we also think that no answer is possible? Maybe the reason why
the counting events in ES map onto the segments of duration in TS in the
way that they do is that there is another beginningless series of events - call
it ES* - such that the events in ES* are responsible for the ones in ES and
such that the events in ES* map onto the segments in TS in that way? For
example, there might be an eternal demon who has - always - been making the man count.
The possibility of this sort of answer to CQ won't get us very far, however. Not because it is logically impossible, but because it merely puts off
the problem. The real underlying question is why the history of "reality"
(including all the events that have ever happened at any time - whether

294

Faith and Philosophy

within or without the physical universe) did not reach its present state
prior to the present time. Why not a year ago? Or two years ago?
So let us deepen our example, this time letting ES stand, not for a series
of particular acts of counting, but rather for a series of past "macro-events,"
each of which includes everything that was going on at the time of that
event. We can then think of these macro-events as a series of "temporal
slices" of the history of "reality." And Craig's question would be - Why
wasn't the whole series of temporal slices completed at an earlier time?
Why wasn't the whole infinite series of macro-events leading up to the present
one completed at T_I or at T_2 or at some yet earlier time? Given the
Principle of Sufficient Reason, there must be an answer. But assuming that
the segments of time in TS are intrinsically indistinguishable from one
another, it appears that no answer is possible.
How strong is this argument? On thing is clear. The argument won't
go through unless we are entitled to think of the series of temporal segments in TS as being independent of the series of events in ES. This seems
wrong to me. As far as I can see, the flow of (dynamic) time just is the continual happening of events, and the past just is the series of events that
have already happened. 15 From this standpoint, there is no more mystery
about the answer to the question, "Why does the series of events end at this
time rather than some other?" than there is about the question, "Why does
the series of times end with this time rather than some other?"
Someone might be tempted to reply that TS is independent of ES only in
the sense in which a metric can be independent of something it is supposed
to measure. But this will hardly serve the needs of the present argument.
If TS is no more than a metric for ordering and measuring the succession of
events in ES, the proper answer to the question, "Why does Eo happen at To
rather than at T_l?" will be nothing more exciting than, "Because that's
how we applied our chosen metric to the series of events."
A simple analogy will make this clear. Suppose that we have a bolt of
cloth, and a measuring stick, calibrated in inches, that we want to use to
measure a ten inch swatch of cloth. Obviously, we can line up the end of
the cloth with the end of the measuring stick, or we can line it up with the
one inch marker on the measuring stick, or with the two inch marker, and
so on. It's completely arbitrary which we decide to do. As long as we can
do simple subtraction, we'll have no trouble measuring out a ten inch
swatch of cloth. Now suppose someone asks, "Why is the edge of the stick
lined up with the end of the cloth? Why not the one inch mark?" This is
hardly a question that "cries out" for a "sufficient reason" type answer. lb
The lesson is clear. In order to motivate the question, "Why To and not
T_?" the series of temporal segments in TS needs to be real and independent of the series of events in ES. It cannot be a mere metric, and its reality
cannot consist wholly in the continual happening of the events in ES. But
it is far from obvious that this is the right way to think about time. Indeed,
the argument under consideration could be viewed, not as a reason for
thinking that the series of events must have a beginning, but rather as a
reason for not adopting a substantivalist theory of time.17
I conclude that the argument under consideration stands or falls with
two highly controversial assumptions - (i) that the series of times at which
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the whose series of events occur is ontologically independent of those
events 'S, and (ii) that something like the principle of sufficient reason
would be applicable to the global correspondence between an infinite
series of events and the series of times at which they occurY

Hilbert's Hotel
Let's turn next to the other main philosophical argument against the
possibility of a beginningless past. If the series of past events had no
beginning, then the set of past events would be an actual infinite. But
Craig thinks that the instantiation of an actual infinite in the real world
would bring with it a number of implications sufficiently absurd to warrant the conclusion that no such set is possible. If this is right, it follows
that the set of all past events is not actually infinite, in which case there
must be a first event in the series of past events.
One of Craig's favorite illustrations of the absurdity of an actual infinite
is "Hilbert's Hotel" - the famous imaginary hotel in which infinitely many
guests occupy infinitely many rooms. The hotel has no vacancies, and yet
space can always be found for new guests merely by deverly reassigning
the old guests to different rooms. No one has to leave the hotel to make
room for the new guests. Craig thinks this is absurd - no matter how large
the hotel, if it is full, one cannot create vacancies merely by moving the
guests into different rooms.
Many philosophers would argue that the "absurdity" of Hilbert's Hotel is
more apparent than real- that one shouldn't expect an infinite set to behave
like a finite one. But others do seem to find the properties of an infinite hotel
more than merely "weird./I They are inclined to agree with Craig that such a
thing could not exist in any possible world. I am not at all sure that they are
right about this, but for the sake of argument, let us provisionally assume
that Hilbert's Hotel really is impossible, on the ground that, no matter what
the size of the hotel, it really is absurd to suppose that one could create new
vacancies merely by moving the guests to different rooms. For ease of exposition,
let's call this the Absurd Implication. How, exactly, is it supposed to follow
that the series of past events could not be actually infinite? Craig explains:
The actual infinite entails, that is, necessarily implies, that such absurdities could exist. Hilbert's illustration merely serves to bring out in a
practical and vivid way what the mathematics necessarily implies;
for if an actually infinite number of things is possible, then a hotel
with an actually infinite number of rooms must be possible. Hence, it
logically follows that if such a hotel is impossible, then so is the real
existence of an actual infinite. 2o
Craig's reasoning may conveniently be outlined as follows:
1. Hilbert's Hotel is not possible. (On account of the Absurd

Implication.)
2. If Hilbert's Hotel is not possible, then no actually infinite set is possible.
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3. Therefore no actually infinite set is possible. (from 1 and 2)
And since
4. An infinite series of past events would be an actual infinite.
it also follows that
5. An infinite series of past events is not possible. (from 3 and 4)
We are assuming, for the sake of argument, that premise 1 is true. I
have no quarrel with premise 4. But what about premise 2? Can we generalize the impossibility of a hotel with infinitely many rooms to all sets with
infinitely many members?
It's not at all obvious that we can. Before leaping to the conclusion that
infinite sets are impossible in general, we need to ask what it is in the example that generates the Absurd Implication and whether some analogous
feature is present in all infinite sets. 21 In the case before us, I think the
Absurd Implication follows from the way in which infinity interacts with
other features of the example. A hotel is a collection of co-existent objects
(rooms and guests) whose physical relationship to one another can be
changed. It is only when these features are combined with the property of
having infinitely many rooms and guests, that one can draw the Absurd
Implication. If the rooms and guests did not exist simultaneously, the idea
of the hotel's being "full" would lose all meaning. If it were metaphysically impossible to change the physical relationship between guests and
rooms - if the guests were not the sort of thing that could be moved from
one room to another, then they would exist immutably in their immutable
rooms, and the Absurd Implication would again not follow.
What, then, does the "absurdity" of Hilbert's Hotel entitle us to conclude about the actual infinite? Not, I think, that no set of real objects could
be actually infinite, but at most that there cannot be an actually infinite set
of a certain sort - one whose elements are co-existing objects bearing a
changeable physical relationship to one another. It is only when these features
are taken together - as they are when we postulate infinitely many guests
in a changeable relationship to the infinitely many rooms they occupy that we get the Absurd Implication.
The" absurdity" of Hilbert's Hotel cannot therefore be generalized to all
infinite sets. For example, it does not follow from the special impossibility
of Hilbert's Hotel that there could not be infinite sets of numbers or other
abstract entities. Craig, of course, denies that abstract entities exist "in reality." But he cannot show that he is right about this merely by pointing out
that one cannot create vacancies in a hotel by moving the guests around. A
Platonist about numbers is not committed to thinking that one can move
the other numbers around so as to make "room" for a new one that one
has just been "created." Numbers are simply not the sort of thing that can
be shuffled around or created or changed in any other way.
More importantly for our purposes, there is no Hilbert's Hotel problem for an infinite series of past events. A temporal series of past events
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cannot be changed or "manipulated" in such a way as to produce paradoxes analogous to those of Hilbert's Hotel. There is no sense whatever
in the idea of shifting the events of the year 1939 to 1938, the events of
1938 to 1937, and so on, to "make room" for some other set of events that
one wants to slip into the year 1939. And this is so whether or not the past
has a beginning. The special impossibility of an infinite hotel (assuming
still that it really is impossible) does not therefore entail that an infinite
series of past events is impossible.
However, the following objection has been suggested to me. 22Assuming
(as Craig does) a dynamic theory of time, there is a sense in which the position of each past event in the temporal series is continually changing. Each
past event sinks further and further into the past as new events become
present and then past. But if the past is infinite, then (so the objection goes)
every possible temporal location in the past is already occupied by a past
event. Where, then, are present and future events supposed to go when
they become past?
Do we now have a Hilbert's Hotel problem for the infinite past? I don't
think so. It is true, of course, that on a dynamic theory of time, past events
change their temporal location in relation to the present. And it also no
doubt true that every one of the infinitely many past temporal locations is
occupied by a past event. (If, as I suggested in section II, the passage of
time just is the happening of events, then of course each temporal location
will be occupied by some event or other. 23 ) But why suppose that the past
already contains all possible past times? Why not simply say that new temporal locations are continually added to the past to accommodate new
events as they become past?
If we insist on comparing the series of past times to a hotel, we should
compare it to an infinite hotel in which there is always room for new
guests - not because the old guests are moved out of one room and into
another - but because new rooms can be added to accommodate them.
Nothing like the Absurd Implication follows from such a scenario.24
But perhaps the objector is thinking along the following lines. Suppose
the temporal positions in the infinite past are numbered sequentially, one
location for each negative number up to -1. Then all the negative numbers
(and the corresponding temporal locations) are "taken" and none of them
is available for the newly past event. Obviously enough, a new negative
number cannot be created to accommodate the newly past event. Does it
not follow that all possible locations are already occupied by the infinitely
many past events?
No, it does not follow. The series of negative numbers functions here
only as a set of labels for the series of temporal positions. No matter how
many distinct temporal locations are added to the infinite past, one can
always re-Iabel them in such a way that they are placed in a (different) oneone-one correspondence with the negative numbers. Such are-labeling
obviously does not entail kicking events out of their previously held temporallocations. If we bother with labels at all, every past moment continually
gets a new numerical "label" corresponding to its distance from the present.
But that is not at all like physically moving guests from one set of rooms to
another, and nothing like the Absurd Implication rears its ugly head.
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As it happens, however, Craig has argued that such a re-labeling of
the elements in an infinite set is impossible. He considers a similar suggestion in connection with another of his examples - the infinite library
in which the books are numbered from zero onwards. Craig had argued
that no books could be added to such a library, since all the numbers are
already "taken," and Quentin Smith replied that the books might simply
be re-numbered. Craig's reply is that this would violate "the initial conditions laid down in the argument", according to which we are to imagine "a series of consecutively numbered books beginning at 0 and
increasing infinitely, not a series of books numbered from some finite
number." "Once the objects are numbered as stipulated", Craig says,
"reassigning the numbers to begin with the proposed addition seems

impossible."25
I do not find this argument of Craig's at all convincing. Neither in the case
of the infinite library nor in that of an infinite series of past events are we violating "the initial conditions" of the example. The "initial condition" in the
library case is that the books are numbered from zero onwards, not that the
numerals on the spines of the books are immutably attached to just those
books. And the proposed "initial condition" in the case of the infinite series of
past events is that they are correlated with the negative numbers - not that this
particular correlation stays immutably the same. It is perfectly consistent with
the example as I have described it to say that the way in which past events are
correlated with the negative numbers is subject to continual change.
I think we may safely conclude that the special peculiarity of Hilbert's
Hotel cannot be duplicated for an infinite series of past events. The
Absurd Implication follows from Hilbert's Hotel only because of the way in
which it combines the infinite number of rooms (and guests) with other features of the example. What has been "reduced to absurdity", therefore, is
not the possibility of an actual infinite, but at most the combination of the
actual infinite with these other features. Infinite sets that do not possess
these features - such as an infinite series of past events - are not shown to
be impossible by this Absurd Implication.
It is true, of course, that any infinite set (including Hilbert's Hotel) will
have other implications that Craig believes to be absurd. The number of
elements in the set of natural numbers is no greater than the number of
odd numbers. So if the rooms in an infinite hotel are numbered from 1
onwards, then the total number of rooms is not greater than the total number of odd-numbered rooms. Similar things could be said about an infinite
series of events or chunks of temporal duration. For example, if infinitely
many hours have gone by, then the number of minutes that have passed is
not greater than the number of hours (or days or weeks or months or
years) that have passed by. And if that is absurd, then metaphYSical time
must have a beginning.
But all the rest of the window-dressing - all the talk about moving infinitely many guests from one room to another in an infinite hotel - is a distraction from the main issue. Even if these consequences of an infinite hotel
are genuinely absurd, they cannot be generalized to all infinite sets in such a
way as to show that an actually infinite series of past events is impossible.
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Euclid's maxim about wholes and parts
So let's restrict ourselves to properties that are shared by all infinite sets.
Would these properties lead to absurdity if they were instantiated in the
real world? Craig thinks so. Since, as all must agree, the number of elements in any infinite set is not greater than the number of elements in infinitely many of its proper subsets, Craig thinks that all infinite sets necessarily violate a principle he refers to as "Euclid's Maxim."
EM A whole is greater than any of its parts. 26
And since he believes that EM must be true of any set instantiated in the
"real world," he concludes that there can be no infinite sets in the real
world. If Craig is right about this, we have a completely general argument
- one that, if sound, could be deployed even against an infinite series of
events. But is he right?
The first thing to see is that Euclid's maxim about wholes and parts
says nothing about the number of elements in a set. At most, it entails that
taken as a whole, a set is greater than a mere part (a proper subset) of itself.
This is important, because Craig's argument turns on the claim that an
infinite set would not be "greater" than some of its parts, and because (as
we are about to see) there is a perfectly straightforward sense in which an
infinite set is greater than any of its proper subsets, even those having infinitely many members.
The example of an infinite hotel makes this clear. There is an obvious
sense in which Hilbert's Hotel is "greater" than any of its parts, and this is
so even though it does not have a greater number of rooms than some of
them have. For instance, the hotel as a whole is "greater" ("larger") than
the part of the hotel containing only rooms numbered 3 and higher simply
in virtue of the fact that it contains rooms numbered 0, 1, and 2 as well as all the
higher numbered rooms. This is all by itself a perfectly legitimate sense of the
word "greater" - one that is logically independent of the question, "What
is the number of rooms in the two sets?" In this sense, any set - even an
infinite one - is "greater" than any of its parts. When the word" greater" is
understood in this way, Hilbert's Hotel does not violate EM.
Euclid's Maxim, then, is not sufficient to get Craig's argument off the
ground. His argument requires a principle that refers explicitly to the number of elements in a set. Something like the following would do the trick.
CM A set must have a greater number of elements than any of its
proper subsets. 27
But is CM true of all sets that might be instantiated in the real world?
Everyone would agree that while it is true of all finite sets, it cannot be true
of infinite sets (if there are any). But what should we conclude from this?
That there can't be any infinite sets? Or merely that CM is true of finite
sets, but not of all sets?
You might think Craig could break the impasse by exhibiting the various "absurdities" that would follow from the instantiation of infinite sets
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in the real world. But as we have seen, the "absurdity" of Hilbert's Hotel
follows only when infinity is combined with other features of the example
that do not apply to all infinite sets. And as far as I can see, the other supposed "absurdities" Craig finds in infinite sets will be deemed "absurd"
only by those who are already committed to something like CM. If you
don't already think CM is true for all sets, you have no reason to think it
"absurd" to suppose that the number of rooms in an infinite hotel is not
greater than the number of rooms in some of its proper parts, or that the
number of minutes is not greater than the number of hours in a beginningless past. Craig's examples doubtless bring out "anti-infinitist" intuitions
in some people, but they do not settle the issue for the rest of us.

What is infinity minus infinity?
However, Craig insists that his argument against the actual infinite does
not rest on Euclid's Maxim alone .
... not all the absurdities stem from infinite set theory's denial of
Euclid's axiom: the absurdities illustrated by guests checking out of
the hotel stem from the self-contradictory results when the inverse
operations of subtraction or division are performed using transfinite
numbers. Here the case against an actually infinite collection of
things becomes decisive. 28
What are these "self-contradictory answers?" They are the answers we
get when we try to "subtract infinity from infinity." Here is one of Craig's
explanations:
Suppose the guests in room numbers 1, 3, 5, ... check out. In this case
an infinite number of people have left the hotel, but according to the
mathematicians there are no less people in the hotel-but don't talk to
that laundry woman! ... But suppose instead the persons in room
number 4, 5, 6, ... checked out. At a single stroke the hotel would be
virtually emptied, the guest register reduced to three names, and the
infinite converted to finitude. And yet it would remain true that the
same number of guests checked out this time as when the guests in
room numbers 1, 3, 5, ... checked out,29
It is not immediately clear that there is any "contradiction" here that we
need to worry about. 30 The supposed difficulty arises only if it is assumed
that inverse arithmetical operations can be performed on the number of
elements in any set that can be instantiated in the "real world." But why
should we agree to operate on that assumption? In Theism, Atheism, and
Big Bang CosmologJ), Craig explains why he thinks so in terms of another of
his examples - an imaginary infinite library.

While we may correct the mathematician who attempts inverse operations with transfinite numbers, we cannot in the real world prevent
people from checking out what books they please from our library.31
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Craig's argument here is that since books can be checked out of any
library in the "real world," inverse operations must be capable of being performed on the number of books in the library. Presumably Craig would
give a similar argument for hotels. Since guests can check out of any hotel,
inverse operations can always be performed on the number of guests.
Craig apparently assumes that a parallel argument is available for any
set that could be instantiated in the "real world." If so, he is mistaken. The
argument implicitly appeals to features of the infinite library (or the infinite hotel) that are not possessed by just any infinite set - and in particular
are not possessed by an infinite series of past events. Whether or not the past is
infinite, one cam10t "remove" an event from the past. What has happened
cannot (now) not have happened. So this particular motive for thinking
that arithmetical subtraction must be possible does not apply to the case
we are principally interested in.
But even as applied to infinite libraries and hotels the argument is a non
sequitur. From the fact that (Ko - Ko) is undefined it does not follow that one
cannot check books out of the imaginary library or that guests cannot leave
Hilbert's Hotel. What follows is only that, depending on which books are
removed, the number of volumes present in the library (or guests in the hotel)
mayor may not be smaller after their removal. That is indeed a characteristic of any actually infinite set, but it is hardly a "logical contradiction." And
it is unlikely to bother anyone who is not already committed to CM. '2

The Infinite Future
If there were a genuine contradiction here, this would have exceedingly
unwelcome consequences for those who, like Craig, believe in the life eternal. By way of illustration, suppose that some created spirit will be saying
"hallelujah" on a regular basis forever. Then infinitely many hallelujahs
will be said in heaven. No matter how many have been said, infinitely
many remain. (In the words of a much loved hymn, "When we've been
there ten thousand years, bright shining as the sun, we've no less days to
sing God's praise than when we first begun.") Now "subtract" every other
hallelujah. The "remainder" is infinite. Next "subtract" all those that will
be said after January 1, 2100. The "remainder" is finite. And yet the number of hallelujahs subtracted in each case is the same!
Craig would presumably grant that no matter how many hallelujahs
have been said, another will be said. But he would insist there is no future
time at which infinitely many of them have been said. The series of future
hallelujahs is only potentially infinite. It is not therefore an infinite of the
sort that he has a problem with.
Unfortunately, things are not this simple. While it is true that there will
be no time at which infinitely many hallelujahs have been said, the fact
remains that infinitely many will be said. This endless series of future hallelujahs can be placed in one-to-one correspondence to the series of natural
numbers. Why isn't that sufficient to make the series of hallelujahs an
actual infinite of just the sort the Craig finds so objectionable?
If is fairly clear how Craig would answer this objection. An event, he
says, is "that which happens."33 He holds that future events do not exist,

302

Faith and Philosophy

since they are not (yet) happening. Consequently, Craig believes that there
is no set of actually existing future events. That is why he thinks a series of
future events cannot be an actual infinite.
But how, one may ask, is that supposed to make the future different
from the past? Future events are not yet happening. But it is equally true
that past events are no longer happening. Should we then conclude that
past events no longer exist, and that a beginningless series of past events
would not be an actual infinite? No. Craig insists that past events do exist.
Here is his explanation.
Since past events, as determinate parts of reality, are definite and distinct and can be numbered, they can be conceptually collected into a
totality. Therefore, if the temporal sequence of events is infinite, the
set of all past events will be an actual infinite.34
But surely, one might reply, the future hallelujahs in our example are
also "definite" and "distinct" and can be "numbered." If not by us, then by
God. So how is this supposed to make the past different from the future?
I suppose someone might argue that the particular future hallelujahs in
the sequence of future events cannot even be referred to, in which case
they obviously could not be "conceptually collected into a totality." Is
this at all plausible?
As far as I can see, there is only one way to make sense of this suggestion. If the future, unlike the past, were at least partly indeterminate, i.e., if
there were genuine truth value gaps for at least some future tense propositions, then it would be open to Craig to hold that there is not a complete
and determinate set of truths about each future hallelujah - in which case
he might perhaps have some basis for arguing that we cannot refer to
them, or treat them as future particulars that could be "conceptually collected into a totality."
This move is not available to Craig, however, since he believes that
God has complete and infallible foreknowledge of the future. Indeed, he
explicitly denies that there are truth value gaps for any future tense
propositions, thereby committing himself to the view that there is always - a complete body of truth about the future. It is therefore very
hard to see how the endless series of future events is supposed to be relevantly different from a beginningless series of past events. If the latter
can be "conceptually collected," so can the former. If we can speak
meaningfully about particular future events, and formulate true propositions about them, then there is no reason at all why we cannot distinguish them from one another and number them. Since (as Craig agrees)
there is no last member of the series of future events, they can be placed
in one-to-one correlation with the series of natural numbers. And if that
is sufficient to make an actual infinite out of a beginningless series of
events that have happened, then it must surely do the same for the endless series of events that will happen. Given that there is a complete
body of truth about the future, we must conclude either that the future is
not endless or that it is an actual infinite.
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Conclusion
I have tried to show that neither of Craig's philosophical arguments
against the possibility of an infinite past is successful. This is important
because it leaves open the possibility that the beginning of our universe was
caused by the most recent in an infinite series of dependent causes. The
kalam argument does not, then, provide a conclusive proof of a first cause.35
On the other hand, the Imlam argument does force us to ask hard questions - Why did our universe corne into existence? Where did it corne
from? - to which theists may believe they have a very good answer. Even
if the conclusions of this paper are correct, it might still be the case that creation ex nihilo by a personal God is more likely than a beginningless series
of dependent causes. How much (if any) more likely - and whether it is
likely enough to warrant belief in God - are questions that must be left for
another occasion.36
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NOTES
1. The term is derived from the phrase kalam Allah (Arabic for "word of
God"). The kalam cosmological argument is so called in recognition of its
advocacy by Muslim philosophers in the eighth to the tenth centuries. In our
time, it has been stoutly defended by William Lane Craig, among others. The
core argument has two premises and a conclusion. (1) Whatever begins to
exist must have a cause. (2) The universe began to exist. Therefore (3) the universe has a cause.
2. J. Richard Gatt III, James E. Gunn, David N. Schramm, Beatrice M.
Tinsley, "Will the Universe Expand Forever?," Scientific American, March 1976,
p. 65. Quoted by William Lane Craig in "Philosophical and Scientific Pointers
to Creation Ex Nihilo", R. Douglas Geivett and Brendan Sweetman, eds.
Contemporary Perspectives on Religious Epistemology (New York and Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1992), 185-200.
3. Adapted from William Lane Craig, "The Origin and Creation of the
Universe: A Response to Adolf Griinbaum", British Journal for the Philosophy of
Science 43 (1992), 233-240.
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Creation: Science, Faith and Intelligent Design, ed. By William A. Dembski
(Downers Grove, Ill.: InterVarsity Press, 1998), 350-l.
5. Craig sometimes argues against such possibilities on empirical grounds.
For example, he claims that the most recent scientific evidence suggests that the
universe is not headed toward a ''big crunch," contrary to what is required by
an oscillating theory of the universe. However, I do not think this is an especially strong reason for out-and-out rejection the possibility that our universe is the
most recent in a series of universes. It is doubtless true that the present state of
the scientific evidence does not support this possibility over any other that we
can think of in our more speculative moments. But unless it is assumed that
previous universes would have had the same basic composition and laws as
ours, the possibility remains open that each of them ended in such a way as to
enable the production of yet another universe. As far as the scientific evidence
is concerned, the right course may simply be to suspend judgment about what
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did or did not happen "prior" to the big bang. It is fun to speculate, but I doubt
that the empirical evidence by itself warrants belief one way or the other. That
is one reason why I think the a priori arguments for an absolute beginning discussed in this paper are so important to the success of the lealam argument.
6. "The Existence of God and the Beginning of the Universe," Truth: A
Journal of Modern Thought 3 (1991): 85-96. (http://www.leaderu.com/
truth/3truth11.html). For ease of exposition, I have reversed the order of Craig's
premises and re-numbered them.
7. The precise way in which Craig thinks it makes the difficulty worse will
be discussed in the next section.
8. "Professor Mackie and the Kalam Cosmological Argument." Religious
Studies 20 (1985): 367-375.
9. "The Existence of God and the Beginning of the Universe."
10. "Philosophical and Scientific Pointers to Creation ex Nihilo", 189-90.
11. "The Existence of God and the Beginning of the Universe."
12. "The Existence of God and the Beginning of the Universe."
13. This line of argument was originally suggested to me by the comments
of David Oderberg, who was the designated respondent to an earlier version
of this paper that I presented at the meeting of the Evangelical Philosophical
Association (in conjunction with the meeting of the American Academy of
Religion) in Denver on November 18, 2001. However, I have developed the
argument in my own way, and Oderberg is not responsible for my interpretation (or for any possible misunderstanding) of his remarks.
14. Indeed, Craig is careful to distance the kalam argument from the
Leibnizian argument from contingency. See the introductory paragraphs of
"The Existence of God and the Beginning of the Universe."
15. It is not entirely clear where Craig stands on this issue. He has for the
most part defended a relational view of time on which it is impossible for time
to exist in the complete absence of events (other than the passage of time
itself). (See, for example, "Philosophical and Scientific Pointers to Creation ex
Nihilo", 197-8.) That is why he thinks (i) that there could be no "empty" time
prior to the first event, (ii) that God must be timeless "prior" to the first event
in metaphysical time, and (iii) that God is the timeless creator of time.
Nevertheless, I suppose it might be just possible for Craig to defend the view
that, while the series of temporal intervals (TS) could not have existed without
any events, it might have existed without this series of events (ES). In that
case, the precise correlation between TS and ES might still be a contingent fact
- and one that (given the principle of sufficient reason) would require explanation. As far as I can see, however, such a view of the relation between the
passage of time and the happening of events has little to recommend it apart
from the need to make out the present argument against the possibility of an
infinite past. However a full and fair exploration of the ontological status of
time is beyond the purview of the present paper.
16. Barbara Morriston suggested this example to me.
17. Such an argument would be somewhat similar to Leibniz's defense of
the claim that "instants apart from things are nothing." Leibniz thought it was
necessary to choose choose between the principle of sufficient reason and a
substantivalist of time. See the third paper in the Leibniz-Clarke correspondence (paragraph 6), where Leibniz argues as follows: "Suppose someone asks
why God did not create everything a year sooner; and that the same person
wants to infer from that that God did something for which He cannot possibly
have had a reason why He did it thus rather than otherwise, we should reply
that his inference would be true if time were something apart from temporal
things, for it would be impossible that there should be reasons why things
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should have been applied to certain instants rather than to others, when their
succession remained the same. But this itself proves that instants apart from
things are nothing, and that they only consist in the successive order of things;
and if this remains the same, the one of the two states (for instance that in
which the creation was imagined to have occurred a year earlier) would be
nowise different and could not be distinguished from the other which now
exists." (Leibniz: Philosophical Writings, tr. by Mary Morris (E. P. Dutton:
London and New York, 1956),200.)
18. By "ontologically independent", I mean that it is possible in the "broadly logical" sense that those times could have existed without those events.
19. It is also interesting to note that this "sufficient reason" argument has
nothing to do with the successive addition of events. To see this, imagine an infinite time of the B-series sort that is completely filled by an actually infinite
series of events. Now arbitrarily designate a time T in the B-series of times.
There are infinitely many temporal positions earlier than T, and infinitely
many events located at those positions. Given well-known properties of the
actual infinite, different pairings of events and times are logically possible. So
one could just as easily ask, "Why are the infinitely many events located at this
infinite series of times, rather than at some earlier infinite series of times?"
Assuming that the B-series of times is (i) independent of the B-series of events,
and (ii) that the B-series of times is completely homogenous, no answer is possible. That is a problem, of course, only if you accept a version of the Principle
of Sufficient Reason strong enough to require an answer. But what is noteworthy here is that the argument has nothing to do with successive addition or with
Craig's claim that one cannot complete an infinite series. Instead of giving a
straightforward defense of the successive addition argument, it seems that we
have merely changed the subject, offering a quite different line of argument
against the infinite past.
20. William Lane Craig, Reasonable Faith: Christian Truth and Apologetics
(Wheaton, IlL: Crossway, 1984),97.
21. That is, in any infinite set that might be instantiated in reality. Craig
has always said that he has no wish to drive mathematicians from their
"Cantorian paradise." But he also acknowledges that he is committed to a
non-realist view of mathematics.
22. By David Oderberg. See note 11 above.
23. The event-bound view of time I have been assuming here might have to
be qualified slightly to allow for the possibility of temporal gaps in which no
events are occurring. But the possibility of such "gaps" would nave no bearing
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29. "The Existence of God and the Beginning of the Universe."
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Transfinite Numbers and the Kalam Cosmological Argument", International
Philosophical Quarterly, 35, 2, 219-221.
31. Theism, Atheism, and Big Bang Cosmology, 15.
32. And if it were contradictory, then, contrary to what Craig supposes, it
would deprive mathematicians of their "Cantorian paradise." Logical consistency is at least as important in mathematics as it is in the "real world!"
33. Theism, Atheism, and Big Bang Cosmology, 24.
34. Theism, Atheism, and Big Bang Cosmology, 25.
35. Another set of implications is also noteworthy. If metaphysical time
needn't have a beginning, then, contrary to what Craig supposes, there is no reason to thmk that there is a first event in God's life, and consequently no reason to
thmk either that God is the creator of time or that he is timeless sans creation.
36. I would like to thank David Oderberg for an exceptionally stimulating
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paper. (See note 11 above.) I would also like to thank Barbara Morriston,
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